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Vallejos Evangeline B. v Commissioner of 
Registration: Why Foreign Domestic Helpers 
do not have the Right of Abode
?
Po Jen Yap*
In deciding whether a foreign domestic helper could acquire the right of abode, 
(1) the Court of First Instance (CFI) was right to have rejected any reliance 
on an Immigration Department booklet published in April 1997 as it lacked 
any probative value in discerning the Sino-British understanding of the term 
“ordinarily resided” under Art 24(2)(4) of the Basic Law; (2) however, the 
CFI had misapplied the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) precedent in Chong 
Fung Yuen when rejecting the 1996 Opinions of the Preparatory Committee 
in its interpretation of Art 24(2)(4); and (3) the CFI wrongly assumed that, 
in deciding what constitutes “ordinary residence”, the CFA in Prem Singh 
had merely required one’s residence to be adopted voluntarily and for a settled 
purpose.
Introduction
The Hong Kong Court of First Instance (CFI) recently handed down 
a groundbreaking decision in Vallejos Evangeline B. v Commissioner of 
Registration,1 which held that a foreign domestic helper (FDH) could 
acquire the right of abode in Hong Kong. In essence, the CFI held that 
FDHs could be considered to be in ordinarily residence in Hong Kong 
and were thus eligible to acquire the right to permanent residence under 
Art  24(2)(4)2 of the Basic Law. In deciding whether the FDHs were 
ordinarily resident in Hong Kong, the CFI held that (1) it was bound 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong; LLB (NUS), LLM (Harvard), LLM 
(London), MSt (Cantab). The author is grateful to Cora Chan and an anonymous reviewer for 
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1 (HCAL 124/2010, [2011] HKEC 1289).
2 Article 24(2)(4) of the Basic Law reads: The permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region shall be … persons not of Chinese nationality who have entered 
Hong Kong with valid travel documents, have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous 
period of not less than seven years and have taken Hong Kong as their place of permanent 
residence before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
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by the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) decision in Ng Ka Ling v Director of 
Immigration3 to reject post-Basic Law enactment materials, which herein 
took the form of an Immigration Department booklet published in April 
1997, that purported to shed light on the Sino-British understanding of 
the term “ordinarily resided”;4 (2) it was bound by the CFA’s decision in 
Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen5 to reject the use of the Opinions 
of the Preparatory Committee in 1996 to assist in the interpretation 
of the Basic Law; and (3) it was bound by the CFA decisions in Prem 
Singh v Director of Immigration6 and Fateh Muhammad v Commissioner of 
Registration7 defi nitional understanding of “ordinary residence”, which 
merely required the residence to be adopted voluntarily and for a settled 
purpose.8 
The facts and procedural history of the case may be briefl y stated. 
The applicant came from the Philippines and had been employed as an 
FDH in Hong Kong since 1986. In 2008, she applied for a permanent 
identity card but her application was rejected by the Commissioner of 
Registration as s 2(4)(a)(vi) of the Immigration Ordinance established 
that a person shall not be treated as ordinarily resident in Hong Kong 
if he or she, while employed as a domestic helper, was from outside 
Hong Kong. She next appealed to the Registration of Persons Tribunal 
and her appeal was dismissed. By way of judicial review, she eventually 
sought to have s 2(4)(a)(vi) invalidated on the basis that the provision 
violated Art 24(2)(4) of the Basic Law. 
In this Comment, I shall advance the following arguments: (1) the CFI 
was right to have rejected any reliance on an Immigration Department 
booklet published in April 1997 as it lacked any probative value in 
discerning the Sino-British understanding of the term “ordinarily 
resided”; (2) however, the CFI had misapplied the Court of Final Appeal 
(CFA) precedent in Chong Fung Yuen when rejecting the 1996 Opinions 
of the Preparatory Committee in its interpretation of Art 24(2)(4); and 
(3) the CFI wrongly assumed that in deciding what constituted “ordinary 
residence” the CFA in Prem Singh had merely required one’s residence to 
be adopted voluntarily and for a settled purpose. These arguments will 
now be explored in turn. 
3 (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4.
4 See n 1 above at para 121. 
5 (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211.
6 (2003) 6 HKCFAR 26.
7 (2001) 4 HKCFAR 278. 
8  See n 1 above at para 146.
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Immigration Department Booklet Lacks Probative Value in 
Discerning Sino-British Understanding of “Ordinarily Resided”
The fi rst argument can be easily dealt with. Counsel for the government 
had sought to argue that in construing what “ordinarily resided” 
meant under Art  24(2)(4) of the Basic Law, the court could admit 
post-enactment materials to ascertain the purpose and context of this 
provision. Art 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
in particular, has provided that “any subsequent agreement between the 
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty” shall be taken into 
account. However, the government did not provide any record of such 
subsequent agreement between China and the United Kingdom, and the 
only evidence of it adduced was the Immigration Department booklet 
published in 1997. Surely, a mere administrative pamphlet that advised 
on the practices of the Hong Kong Immigration Department could hardly 
be considered probative evidence of an international consensus reached 
between the Sino-British governments, even if the material professed 
to comply with the views of both governments. If the government seeks 
to establish any Sino-British consensus on this term, it certainly has to 
do better. The CFI was therefore right to have rejected any reliance on 
the Immigration Department booklet published in 1997 to construe the 
meaning of “ordinarily resided” under the Basic Law. 
Chong Fung Yuen Did not Reject any Recourse to the 1996 
Opinions of the Preparatory Committee when Interpreting 
Article 24(2)(4) 
The CFI next held that in respect of “the use of the 1996 Opinions to 
assist in the interpretation of the Basic Law, this court is bound by the 
decision of the Court of Final Appeal in Chong Fung Yuen”9 and any 
judicial recourse to these materials was equally rejected. 
There are several problems with the CFI's arguments herein. In Chong 
Fung Yuen, the CFA held that under Art 24(2)(1) of the Basic Law, the 
court could not look at the Preparatory Committee’s Opinions on the 
implementation of Art 24(2) “as the meaning of art 24(2)(1) is clear; 
there is no ambiguity”10 and, therefore, the court was unable to “depart 
from what it considers to be the clear meaning of art 24(2)(1) in favour 
9 See n 1 above at para 122. 
10 See n 5 above at 233.
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of a meaning which the language cannot bear.”11 Article 24(2)(1) states 
unequivocally that the permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region shall be “Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong 
before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region.” Unlike Art 24(2)(1), where there is no defi nitional  ambiguity 
in the text, Art  24(2)(4) includes the textually ambiguous term of 
“ordinarily resided”, which the CFI conceded “may carry different 
meanings in different contexts.”12 Given that Art 24(2)(4) includes an 
unclear, ambiguous term open to differing interpretations, the CFI was 
wrong to assume that the CFA in Chong Fung Yuen had foreclosed any 
judicial reliance on the 1996 Opinions of the Preparatory Committee 
when interpreting the said provision. The CFA only rejected any reliance 
on the Preparatory Committee Opinions as the text of Art 24(2)(1) was 
clear. Article 24(2)(4) is not. Therefore, while Chong Fung Yuen would 
forbid the use of post-enactment materials when the text of the Basic Law 
“is free from ambiguity”,13 the CFA therein was open to the consideration 
of post-enactment materials when the Basic Law terms were unclear and 
ambiguous, but the courts must approach these post-enactment materials 
“cautiously”.14 Even if the CFI indeed had a “very cogent justifi cation”15 
for not looking at the 1996 Opinions when interpreting Art 24(2)(4), 
the court unfortunately failed to explain what these valid reasons were. 
The CFA in Chong Fung Yuen would have expected no less. 
Of course, it was still open to the CFI to disagree with the 1996 
Opinions of the Preparatory Committee on their understanding of 
Art 24(2)(4), but it is a wholly different matter for the court to reject 
their relevance as a result of a misapplication of the CFA precedent in 
Chong Fung Yuen. 
Prem Singh Does not Merely Require one’s Residence to be Adopted 
Voluntarily and for a Settled Purpose 
Finally, we turn to the crux of the constitutional challenge and the 
judicial determination of what “ordinary residence” entails.16 The 
11 Ibid. 
12 See n 1 above at para 145.
13 See n 5 above at 224.
14 See n 5 above at 225. 
15 See n 1 above at para 120. 
16 The CFI was also right to have rejected the relevance of Art  154(2) when it sought to 
interpret Art  24(2)(4). Article  154(2) authorises the HKSAR government to exercise 
immigration controls but this provision does not shed light on what type of immigration 
control is constitutionally permissible. After all, surely Art 154(2) cannot be used to justify 
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CFI held that the CFA in Prem Singh had endorsed the test laid down 
by Lord Scarman in Ex parte Shah,17 ie to be in ordinarily residence, 
the residence must be adopted voluntarily and for a settled purpose.18 
Therefore, a FDH would be considered in ordinary residence in 
Hong Kong as he or she comes here voluntarily and resides here for 
a settled purpose, ie employment.19 The CFI held that it had never 
been an element of the Shah test that one had to have the capacity 
to establish a separate household or to bring dependants along to a 
place before he or she could be regarded as ordinarily resident in Hong 
Kong, and the inability to do so did not prevent one from pursuing 
employment as a settled purpose.20 
The CFI was quite right that the CFA in Prem Singh had deemed 
the Shah test applicable in deciding what constituted ordinary residence 
under Art 24(2)(4). Compliance with the Shah test was indeed a necessary 
condition for one to be considered in ordinary residence. But the CFI 
erred in assuming that the compliance with the Shah test was a suffi cient 
condition for one to be in ordinary residence. The CFA had never made 
such a claim. 
In Fateh Muhammad, the CFA held that where a person was serving 
a term of imprisonment, at least when it was not of trivial duration, he 
would not be in ordinary residence. More signifi cantly, Bokhary PJ on 
behalf of the CFA emphasised the following:
“No single judicial pronouncement or combination of such pronouncements in 
regard to the meaning of the expression ‘ordinarily resident’ can be conclusive 
for the purposes of every context in which that expression appears.”21
Subsequently, in Prem Singh, the majority on the CFA held that to 
be in ordinary residence, one must adopt his residence voluntarily 
and for a settled purpose but any incarceration, refl ecting suffi ciently 
any and all types of immigration control measures the HKSAR government seeks to impose 
even if those statutory measures violate other parts of the Basic Law. Furthermore, Prem Singh 
would defi nitely have been decided differently as the invalidated portion of the immigration 
legislation could equally have been justifi ed as a mode of immigration control authorised 
under Art 154(2). But the CFI is arguably wrong to assume that such an expansive reading of 
Art 154(2) is inconsistent with Chong Fung Yuen (see n 1 above at para 141). Article 154(2) 
is found in Part VII of the Basic Law which concerns External Affairs and it authorises visa 
controls on “persons from foreign states and regions”. Therefore, Art 154(2) would arguably 
have no bearing on any immigration controls imposed on the entry or exit of Chinese citizens 
and Hong Kong Permanent Residents. 
17 [1983] 2 AC 309. 
18 See n 1 above at para 149. 
19 See n 1 above at para 171. 
20 See n 1 above at para 173. 
21 See n 7 above at 283–284. 
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serious criminal conduct to warrant an immediate custodial sentence, 
fell outside what could qualify as “the settled purposes” underlying 
a person’s ordinary residence.22 In such an event, Shah would not be 
satisfi ed and there was no occasion for the CFA to elaborate on the other 
extraordinary forms of residence. It is also signifi cant that the CFA never 
opined that the Shah test was the only condition that a person seeking 
the right of abode should satisfy. Indeed, to do so would be inconsistent 
with Bokhary PJ’s pronouncement in Fateh Muhammad that no single 
judicial pronouncement in regard to the meaning of the expression 
“ordinarily resided” could be conclusive for the purposes of every context 
in which that expression appeared. Therefore, while the CFI was right 
that a FDH could satisfy the conditions laid down in Shah, the court 
was wrong to have assumed that the satisfaction of the Shah test was a 
suffi cient condition for one to be in ordinary residence. 
If compliance with the Shah test is not a suffi cient condition for being 
in ordinary residence, my detractors may naturally ask me what other 
conditions are applicable. This is a fair question to which I now turn. 
In ascertaining the meaning of any Basic Law provision, which would 
include the term “ordinarily resided” in Art 24(2)(4), the CFA in Ng 
Ka Ling had advised that the courts must consider the purpose of the 
instrument and its relevant provisions as well as the language of the text 
in light of the context, context being of particular importance in the 
interpretation of a constitutional instrument.23 Furthermore, in Chong 
Fung Yuen, the CFA held the following: 
“Extrinsic materials which can be considered include the Joint Declaration 
and the Explanations on the Basic Law (draft) given at the NPC on 
28 March 1990 shortly before its adoption on 4 April 1990. The state of 
domestic legislation at that time and the time of the Joint Declaration will 
often also serve as an aid to the interpretation of the Basic Law.” 
Therefore, in identifying the context and purpose of the term “ordinarily 
resided” under Art 24(2)(4), the CFA would require courts to consult 
the immigration legislations and practices in 1990 to determine which 
forms of residence would be considered ordinary or extraordinary to 
the framers of the Basic Law. In fact, back in 1990, the Immigration 
Department had already barred FDHs from bringing their dependants to 
Hong Kong, which was extraordinary since other expatriates on general 
employment terms could freely bring in their spouses and dependent 
22 See n 6 above at 53–54. 
23 See n 3 above at 28. 
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children.24 So far as counsel for the government can show how stark 
the differences between the visa control regime for FDHs and those 
expatriates admitted under the general employment policy were back in 
1990, the more extraordinary an FDH’s form of residence in Hong Kong 
must be for the purposes of interpreting Art 24(2)(4). 
The CFI did examine pre-enactment materials and noted that prior to 
1997, only British or Commonwealth citizens could become permanent 
residents in Hong Kong25 but there were no such limitations after the Basic 
Law came into effect. The CFI appeared to be suggesting that although 
the FDHs did not have the right of abode prior to the commencement of 
the Basic Law, this did not mean they could not have acquired this right, 
along with the other non-Commonwealth citizens, when the Basic Law 
came into effect. With respect, it is immaterial that non-Commonwealth 
citizens were not given Permanent Residency (PR) status before the 
Basic Law came into effect; the central point when one reads the Basic 
Law in light of the domestic legislations in 1990 is to ask whether the 
framers would have considered the FDHs (or any group of foreigners) to 
be in “ordinary residence” such that they would be eligible to acquire 
the right of abode when the Basic Law came into effect. Therefore, the 
fact that FDHs were in practice non-Commonwealth citizens, and could 
not be permanent residents before 1997, was wholly irrelevant. The 
central issue regarding the interpretation of Art 24(2)(4) lies only in the 
identifi cation of the groups of foreign citizens that would be considered 
by the framers to be in ordinary residence in Hong Kong, and for this 
purpose, it is wholly irrelevant that non-Commonwealth citizens could 
not acquire Hong Kong permanent residency before 1997. 
At this juncture, I must emphasise that I do not subscribe to a hard-line 
originalist understanding of the Basic Law. Hard-line originalists would 
“look for a sort of objectifi ed intent – the intent that a reasonable person 
would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder 
of the corpus juris”26 and in der iving this objective intent, they 
would only look to historical understandings and practices that were 
accepted at the time the constitutional provisions were adopted. More 
importantly, to these hard-line originalists, any legislative practice that 
was constitutional at and since the time the Constitution was enacted 
cannot be found unconstitutional today. Fortunately, this is not the 
24 See Explanatory Notes Issued by Immigration Department in 1990. Cited in para 39 of the 
judgment. 
25 See n 1 above at para 127. 
26 Antonin Scalia, “Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws”, in A Matter of Interpretation at 17 
(Amy Gutmann ed, 1998).
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practice of the Hong Kong courts as the judiciary has recognised that 
the Basic Law is a “living in s trument tended to meet changing needs and 
circumstances”.27 However, where the Hong Kong judiciary has departed 
from an originalist understanding of the Basic Law, the courts have done 
so when the domestic legislative practice in question is inconsistent 
with the contemporary opinion of liberal democracies as evidenced in 
their legislative practices and / or case law.28 However, with regard to 
this dispute, as far as I am aware, no court or legislature in the world has 
ever conferred upon their FDHs the constitutional right to permanent 
residence. It would thus be wholly reasonable, in this instance, for 
the courts to defer to the framers’ understanding of what constituted 
“ordinary residence” back in 1990, as evidenced in the state of domestic 
legislations at the time the Basic Law was conceived, as these practices 
would form the context against which the Basic Law provisions were 
understood and is to be interpreted. As I have emphasised earlier, so 
far as counsel for the government can show how stark the differences 
were, back in 1990, between the visa control regime for FDHs and those 
from Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries that were 
admitted under the general employment policy, the more extraordinary 
a FDH’s form of residence in Hong Kong must be when one interprets 
Art 24(2)(4). Again, it is irrelevant that non-Commonwealth citizens 
could not acquire the right of permanent residency in 1997; my point is 
that, back in 1990, the form of residence for the FDHs was extraordinary 
even when one compares them with those non-Commonwealth citizens 
admitted on general employment terms.29 In any case, as my learned 
colleague, Professor Albert Chen has convincingly argued in his 
Comment, also published in this issue, the intent of Art 24(2) was to “set 
out the basic principles governing permanent resident status and right of 
abode in the HKSAR, and to confer on the legislature of the HKSAR 
a broad power and a wide margin of appreciation in implementing and 
elaborating such basic principles by more detailed legislative rules.”30 
The CFI, in this regard, had thus erred by assuming that the CFA had 
imposed the Shah test as the only condition a person had to satisfy to be 
in ordinary residence. The court had equally failed to examine closely the 
state of domestic legislations at the time the Basic Law was enacted and 
27 See n 3 above at 27.
28 Leung v Secretary of Justice [2006] 4 HKLRD 21; Chan Kin Sum v Secretary of Justice [2009] 
2 HKLRD 166.
29 See Explanatory Notes Issued by Immigration Department in 1990. Cited in para 39 of the 
judgment.
30 See Albert Chen, “The ‘Foreign Domestic Helpers Case’: the Relevance of the NPCSC 
Interpretation of 1999 and the Preparatory Committee Opinion of 1996” (2011) 41 HKLJ 621. 
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had thus omitted to determine the context against which Art 24(2)(4) 
is to be understood. 
Conclusion 
The CFI in Vallejos Evangeline B. had felt obliged to observe the 
controlling precedents of Chong Fung Yuen and Prem Singh. But neither 
of these CFA decisions would have required Lam J to reach the result he 
did. Unfortunately, the learned judge was solely responsible for the bind 
he was in. 
The ultimate kicker and the greatest irony in this decision would 
have to be Lam J’s observations when he rejected the applicant’s Art 25 
equality ground of challenge and this passage deserves to be cited in 
full: 
“It has to be borne in mind that Art 24(2)(4) confers the status of permanent 
residences on foreign nationals. It must be up to the sovereign authority to 
decide the extent to which such a concession is to be granted. As observed 
by Lord Bingham in Januzi v Home Secretary [2006] 1 AC 426 at p 439G, a 
fundamental principle in international law is that a sovereign state has the 
power to admit, exclude and expel aliens. Therefore there cannot be any 
complaint that Article 24(2)(4) confers such status on certain people but 
not others.”31
I cannot agree any more with the learned judge. One cannot help but 
wish that Lam J had heeded his own advice. 
31 See n 1 above at para 179. 
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